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Abstract—This paper explores the physical-layer security in a
small cell network (SCN) with cooperative cache-enabled small
base stations (SBSs) in the presence of randomly distributed
eavesdroppers. We propose a joint design on the caching place-
ment and the physical-layer transmission to improve the secure
content delivery probability (SCDP). We first put forward a
hybrid caching placement strategy in which a proportion of the
cache unit in each SBS is assigned to store the most popular
files (MPFs), while the remaining is used to cache the disjoint
subfiles (DSFs) of the less popular files in different SBSs as a
means to enhance transmission secrecy and content diversity. We
then introduce two coordinated multi-point (CoMP) techniques,
namely, joint transmission (JT) and orthogonal transmission
(OT), to deliver the MPFs and DSFs, respectively. We derive
analytical expressions for the SCDP in each transmission scheme,
considering both non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping
scenarios. Based on the obtained analytical results, we jointly
design the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching
assignment for maximizing the overall SCDP. Various insights
into the optimal transmission and caching designs are further
provided. Numerical results are also presented to verify our
theoretical findings and to demonstrate the superiority of the
proposed caching and transmission strategies.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, wireless caching, small
cell networks, cooperative transmissions, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
MALL cell network (SCN) is a promising approach to
improving network capacity and achieving seamless wire-
less coverage in the 5G wireless network. Nevertheless, the
increasingly dense deployment of SCNs poses a tremendous
challenge to the backhaul links and the backhaul capacity
has become the major system bottleneck. To alleviate such
bottleneck, wireless caching technique emerges. By pre-storing
popular content at the edge of an SCN such as small base sta-
tions (SBSs) and reusing the cached content to meet frequent
requests from local users, wireless caching is envisioned as an
effective solution for relaxing the challenging demand of small
cell backhauling and reducing the end-to-end latency [1].
Wireless caching has a serious security vulnerability as
any wireless network due to the broadcast nature of the
electromagnetic signal propagation. For example, although
wireless caching has a great potential to meet the soaring
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video-on-demand (VoD) streaming traffic in the 5G network
[2], [3], the broadcast streaming data by caching nodes are
susceptible to potential eavesdroppers such as non-paying
subscribers and malicious attackers. It is of great significance
to propose security-wise caching schemes that can guarantee
both data secrecy and quality of service (QoS). Nonetheless,
safeguarding the security for a cache-enabled wireless network
is confronted with two major challenges. Specifically, the vast
majority of current wireless data services still rely on end-
to-end encryption to ensure data secrecy, e.g., the hypertext
transfer protocol secure (HTTPS) applied for video streaming
applications such as YouTube and Netflix [4]. However, such
encryption schemes might counteract the benefits of wireless
caching in terms of high flexibility and large multiplexing
gains since the encrypted content is uniquely defined for
each user request and cannot be reused to serve other user
requests [5]. Moreover, using the encryption methods will
inevitably introduce a large amount of additional operations in
the storage, management and distribution of secret keys, thus
degrading the efficiency of content placement and delivery.
Fortunately, physical-layer security (PLS) [6], an information-
theoretic approach which has been proven to gain a remarkable
secrecy enhancement in various wireless networks [7]-[18],
provides a new opportunity to overcome the above limitations.
PLS achieves wireless secrecy by using the wiretap channel
encoding instead of the source encryption such that the cached
content still can be reused. Moreover, PLS exploits the ran-
domness inherent to the wireless channels without necessarily
relying on secret keys. All these advantages make PLS and
wireless caching easily integrated in a low-complexity and
high-flexibility way.
A. Previous Works
The cache-enabled SCN is first investigated in [19], where
wireless caching has been shown to significantly reduce the
average downloading delay. In [2], [20], wireless caching has
been exploited to improve the energy efficiency of cellular
networks. In [21], a joint caching and buffering strategy has
been proposed to overcome the backhaul capacity bottleneck
and the half-duplex transmission constraint simultaneously.
Considering cooperative transmissions via distributed caching
helpers, an optimal caching placement has been designed
in [22] as a means to balance the file diversity gain and
the cooperation gain. In [23], [24], the cache-enabled small
cell cooperation in the caching placement (i.e., cache-level
2cooperation) and the physical-layer transmission (i.e., signal-
level cooperation) has been discussed. In [25], the cache- and
signal-level cooperation has been leveraged under a combined
caching placement scheme to improve the cache service per-
formance and the energy efficiency.
Recently, the security issue in the cache-enabled wireless
networks has attracted a stream of research, motivated by
the coded caching scheme introduced in [26]. For example,
a coded caching scheme based on Shannon’s one-time pad
method has been proposed in [27] to guarantee information
secrecy against eavesdroppers. However, achieving secrecy
requires a sufficiently large size of random secret keys, and
secure sharing of such massive secret keys will cause a
considerable system overhead. This scheme has been extended
to the device-to-device networks in [28], where a sophisticated
key generation and encryption scheme has been designed. In
[29], [30], the security-oriented content placement has been
studied based on the maximal distance separable encoding.
All these endeavors have dealt with the security issue from an
information-theoretic point of view, but few has considered
the characteristics of the physical-layer media.
PLS in a cache-enabled wireless network was not consid-
ered until recently. Specifically, the caching-enabled coopera-
tive multi-input multi-output (MIMO) transmission has been
first exploited as an effective PLS mechanism to increase the
secrecy rate of content delivery, confronting either a single
malicious eavesdropper [3] or multiple untrusted cache helpers
[31]. Nevertheless, the signaling design therein heavily relies
on the estimated instantaneous channel state information (CSI)
of the eavesdropper. In practice, it is difficult to estimate
such CSI in real time since the eavesdropper usually listens
passively. Dynamically adjusting the transmission parameters
will also increase the system complexity and the end-to-end
latency. Moreover, the fading feature of the wireless channels
and the randomness of the eavesdroppers’ locations have sig-
nificant impacts on the security performance, and meanwhile
they can also be exploited to facilitate secure transmissions.
However, these aspects have not yet been investigated in [3],
[31]. It is worth mentioning that, there has been substan-
tial research on the PLS in random wireless networks with
both channel and location uncertainties [11]-[18]. Stochastic
geometry theory has provided a powerful tool to study the
network security performance by modeling the positions of
network nodes including the eavesdroppers according to a
spatial distribution such as a Poisson point process (PPP) [32].
To the best of our knowledge, the potential of PLS in securing
the content delivery for a cache-enabled SCN against randomly
distributed eavesdroppers is still elusive, and even a fundamen-
tal mathematical framework for security performance analysis
and optimization from a stochastic geometry perspective is
lacking. This has motivated our work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we will explore the potential of the physical-
layer secure transmission in conjunction with caching place-
ment in realizing secure content delivery against randomly
distributed eavesdroppers. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows.
• We study a combination of cooperations in both cache-
level and signal-level. By cache-level cooperation, we
propose a hybrid caching placement strategy based on
file partition, where every SBS assigns a proportion of its
cache space to store the most popular files (MPFs), while
using the remaining to cache the disjoint subfiles (DSFs)
of the less popular files as a means to improve content
diversity and secrecy. By signal-level cooperation, we
put forward two coordinated multi-point (CoMP) tech-
niques, namely, joint transmission (JT) and orthogonal
transmission (OT), to deliver the cached MPFs and DSFs,
respectively.
• We assess the secure content delivery probability (SCDP),
which measures the probability that the reliability and
secrecy of content delivery can be guaranteed simulta-
neously. We provide analytical results for the SCDP in
each transmission scheme for both non-colluding and
colluding wiretap scenarios. We show that the JT scheme
outperforms the OT scheme in terms of transmission
reliability, whereas the latter provides a higher level of
secrecy.
• We jointly design the optimal transmission rates and the
optimal caching assignment proportion to maximize the
overall SCDP under the proposed caching and transmis-
sion strategies. The whole maximization procedure is de-
composed into two phases. First, the optimal transmission
rates that globally maximize the SCDP in the JT and OT
schemes are obtained by solving a scalar convex problem
and by addressing a vector convex problem through an
alternating optimization, respectively; subsequently, the
optimal caching assignment proportion that maximizes
the overall SCDP is derived in a closed-form expres-
sion. Various insights into the optimal transmission and
caching designs are further provided.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model and the under-
lying optimization problem. In Section III, we analyze the
connection probability and the secrecy probability for both
the JT and OT schemes. In Section IV, we design the op-
timal transmission rates and the optimal caching assignment
proportion to maximize the overall SCDP. In Section V, we
present numerical results to validate our theoretical analysis. In
Section VI, we conclude our work and provide several future
research directions.
Notations: Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors.
(·)T, | · |, ‖ · ‖1, ⌊·⌋, P{·}, EA[·] denote the operations of
transpose, absolute value, L-1 norm, round down, probability
and mathematical expectation taken over the random variable
(RV) A, respectively. Γ(z) =
∫∞
0 e
−ttz−1dt, Γ(a, x) =∫∞
x
e−tta−1dt and erf(z) = 2/
√
π
∫ z
0
e−t
2
dt are the gamma
function [40, Eqn. (8.310.1)], the incomplete gamma func-
tion [40, Eqn. (8.350.2)], and the error function [40, Eqn.
(8.250.1)], respectively. S \ sk denotes the set obtained by
canceling the subset sk from the superset S.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a cache-enabled cooperative SCN. The ongoing content
delivery from the SBSs to an intended user is overheard by randomly located
eavesdroppers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider security issues in a cache-enabled SCN where
a set of SBSs, K = [1, · · · ,K], cooperatively deliver paid
content to a subscriber coexisting with randomly located
eavesdroppers (e.g., non-paying subscribers). All the SBSs are
connected to a central server located at the edge of the core
network via wired backhaul links. A cache unit is deployed
at each SBS for pre-fetching popular content during off-peak
hours from the central server. Once a file requested by a
local user is pre-stored in the cache units, i.e., a cache hit
event takes place, the file can be delivered to the user by
the SBSs directly. Otherwise, a cache miss event is deemed
to occur and the SBSs will fetch the requested file from the
central server before conveying it to the user. We assume that
all the network nodes including the SBSs, legitimate users
and eavesdroppers each have a single antenna, and only one
user can be served in each time slot. The locations of the
SBSs and of the users are assumed deterministic, while those
of eavesdroppers are random and unknown. Without loss of
generality, we place a typical user at the origin of the polar
coordinate, and denote the locations of the k-th nearest SBS
and of the j-th nearest eavesdropper to the typical user as
{bk : (rb,k, θb,k)} and {ej : (re,j , θe,j)}, with r and θ being the
corresponding distance and angle, respectively. The distance
between the k-th SBS and the j-th eavesdropper is expressed
as rj,k =
√
r2b,k + r
2
e,j − 2rb,kre,j cos(θb,k − θe,j). Since the
eavesdroppers are possibly randomly located over the entire
network, we model their positions as a stationary PPP Φe on
the two-dimensional plane R2 with density λe, i.e., ej ∈ Φe
[11]-[18].
To model the wireless channels, including the main channels
spanning from the SBSs to the typical user and the wiretap
channels spanning from the SBSs to the eavesdroppers, we
consider a standard distance-based path loss governed by the
exponent α along with Rayleigh fading. Hence, the channel
gains from the k-th SBS to the typical user and to the j-th
eavesdropper can be expressed as hb,kr
−α/2
b,k and hj,kr
−α/2
j,k ,
respectively, where hb,k and hj,k denote the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading coefficients obeying the
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and unit variance. We assume that the SBSs only know
the statistic CSI (as opposed to the instantaneous) of the main
and the wiretap channels.1
A. Caching Placement Strategy
The central server owns a library of N equal-size files with
Fn being the n-th most popular file. We assume that users
make request for files independently with some probabilities
according to a commonly adopted popularity pattern, i.e.,
Zipf distribution [19]. With the Zipf distribution, the request
probability for the m-th most popular file is given by
fm =
m−γ∑N
n=1 n
−γ
, (1)
where γ models the skewness of the popularity profile. In
particular, the popularity profile is uniform over files for γ = 0,
and becomes more concentrated as γ increases.
We consider a finite caching capacity that the K SBSs each
can store up to L files and the total capacity KL is less than
the library size N , i.e., KL < N . To make efficient use of the
cache units, we propose a hybrid caching placement strategy to
distribute files of different popularities to the SBSs, where each
file is partitioned into K equal-size subfiles. To be specific, we
divide the cache unit in every SBS into two portions, where
a proportion φ of the cache unit is used for storing the most
popular files (i.e., MPF caching) and the rest proportion 1−φ
is reserved for caching the disjoint subfiles of the less popular
files in different SBSs (i.e., DSF caching). Under such a hybrid
caching strategy, file Fn with 1 ≤ n ≤ ⌊φL⌋ belongs to the
MPF group where all the SBSs possess a copy of it; file Fn
with ⌊φL⌋ < n ≤ ⌊φL⌋+K(L− ⌊φL⌋) belongs to the DSF
group where the SBSs each store a unique subfile of it; file
Fn with n > ⌊φL⌋ + K(L − ⌊φL⌋) is not cached and only
can be fetched from the central server.
It is worth noting that, the DSF caching mode helps to
enhance content diversity, i.e., allowing more files to be cached
with a finite caching capacity. This can increase the cache
hit probability and avoid frequently fetching content from the
central server, thus making the communication more efficient.
Furthermore, the different subfiles of each file are elaborately
encoded such that one only can decode them in a sequential
manner [33]. Hence, the risk of the entire file being illegally
intercepted can be significantly lowered since it is difficult to
decode all the subfiles simultaneously. In other words, content
diversity can guarantee a higher level of secrecy.
B. Cooperative Transmission Schemes
When the SBSs receive a file request, they adopt different
transmission schemes depending on the popularity of the
requested file. We propose two CoMP schemes, namely, JT
and OT schemes, which are described as below.
1This is a generic assumption in literature on PLS [7]-[18]. In particular,
if the potential eavesdroppers are also regular users but the ongoing content
delivery should be kept secret to them, it is possible for the SBSs to acquire
the statistic CSI of the eavesdroppers and the distribution of their locations
through a large amount of information exchange during other time slots.
41) Joint Transmission (JT): When the requested file Fn
belongs to the MPF group, the SBSs each have a copy of it. In
order to enhance transmission reliability, the SBSs deliver the
same file to the user simultaneously. We refer to this scheme
as the JT scheme.2 The received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
at the user and at the j-th eavesdropper respectively can be
given by
SNRb = ρ
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
hb,kr
−α/2
b,k
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (2)
SNRj = ρ
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
hj,kr
−α/2
j,k
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, ∀ej ∈ Φe, (3)
where ρ = P/(WN0) denotes the normalized SNR, with P ,
W and N0 being the SBS transmit power, the total available
bandwidth and the noise spectral density, respectively. We
consider identical noise spectral density at all the receivers.
2) Orthogonal Transmission (OT): When the requested file
Fn falls within the DSF group, the SBSs have different subfiles
of it. In order to avoid the co-channel interference, the SBSs
use orthogonal frequency spectrum to deliver these subfiles,
i.e., each SBS occupies 1/K of the overall bandwidth. We
name this scheme the OT scheme. For the subfile delivered
from the k-th SBS, the received SNRs at the user and at the
j-th eavesdropper respectively can be given by
SNRb,k = Kρ |hb,k|2 r−αb,k , (4)
SNRj,k = Kρ |hj,k|2 r−αj,k , ∀ej ∈ Φe. (5)
Note that the factor K exists due to a 1/K decrement of the
available bandwidth for each SBS.
3) Cache Miss (CM): When the requested file Fn is not
cached by the SBSs, i.e., a cache miss event occurs, all the
SBSs fetch the requested file from the central server and
then deliver it to the user simultaneously. Hence, the received
SNRs at the user and at the j-th eavesdropper share the
same expressions as (2) and (3), respectively. For ease of
statement, we call this scheme the CM scheme. The wired
backhauling process is assumed to be secure, whereas it causes
extra delivery delay compared with the cache hit case, which
will result in a lower end-to-end rate. This negative impact
will be considered in the subsequent performance analysis and
optimization.
C. Performance Metrics
To securely deliver the content, the well-known Wyner’s
wiretap encoding scheme is adopted to encode the confidential
information, where redundant information is intentionally em-
bedded to confuse eavesdroppers [6]. The transmission rates
of the confidential information and the redundant information
are referred to as the secrecy rate Rs and the redundant rate
Re, and the wiretap codeword rate is Rt = Rs + Re. We
2Without the instantaneous CSI of the main channels, the JT scheme corre-
sponds to a non-coherent multi-point joint transmission. If the instantaneous
CSI is available, a coherent joint transmission or distributed beamforming
can be realized to further improve transmission reliability, which however
will increase the system overhead.
denote the achievable rates of the main channel and the wiretap
channel as Cb = log2(1 + SNRb) and Ce = log2(1 + SNRe),
respectively, with SNRb and SNRe being the corresponding
SNRs.3 If Cb is larger than or equal to Rt, the legitimate user
can recover the confidential information. The probability that
this event happens is called the connection probability, which
is defined as pc , P{Cb ≥ Rt} [16]. If Ce is lower than or
equal to Re, no confidential information will be leaked to the
eavesdropper. The probability of this event occurs is termed
the secrecy probability, which is defined as ps , P{Ce ≤ Re}
[16].
The content delivery is secure only if the reliability (con-
nection) and the secrecy are guaranteed simultaneously. In
this paper, we employ the metric named SCDP to quantify
the probability that a secure content delivery event occurs.
For a specific transmission scheme, the SCDP can be defined
as the product of the connection probability and the secrecy
probability, i.e., PSscd , pScpSs for S ∈ {JT,OT,CM}.
Therefore, the overall SCDP under the proposed caching and
transmission strategies can be expressed as
Pscd =
∑
S∈{JT,OT,CM}
pStr(φ) PSscd, (6)
where pStr(φ) denotes the probability of the scheme S ∈
{JT,OT,CM} being adopted for content delivery, which can
be calculated from (1), i.e.,
pJTtr (φ) =
⌊φL⌋∑
n=1
fn, p
OT
tr (φ) =
⌊φL⌋+K(L−⌊φL⌋)∑
⌊φL⌋+1
fn, (7a)
pCMtr (φ) = 1− pJTtr (φ)− pOTtr (φ). (7b)
We emphasize that the redundant rate Re (for a target
secrecy rate Rs) and the caching assignment proportion φ
play critical roles in increasing the SCDP. Specifically, Re
triggers a trade-off between transmission reliability and se-
crecy. Choosing a larger Re increases the secrecy probability
ps but decreases the connection probability pc as the wiretap
codeword rate Rt also increases. Likewise, φ strikes a non-
trivial trade-off between transmission reliability, secrecy and
content diversity. On one hand, devoting a larger proportion
φ for MPFs increases the probability of adopting the JT
scheme and thus enhancing transmission reliability. On the
other hand, assigning a larger proportion for DSFs (i.e., a
smaller φ) increases the probability of using the OT scheme
and thus improving transmission secrecy and content diversity.
The overall balance of these opposite impacts on the SCDP
should be carefully addressed.
In the following sections, we will first derive the connection
probability pc and the secrecy probability ps for various
transmission schemes, and then we will design the optimal
redundant rate Re and the optimal caching assignment pro-
portion φ to maximize the overall SCDP Pscd.
III. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PROBABILITIES
ANALYSIS
Since the SCDP is represented as the product of the connec-
tion probability pc and the secrecy probability ps, this section
3All the rate parameters in this paper are measured in the unit: bits/s/Hz.
5will analyze pc and ps for the JT and OT schemes, respectively.
The analysis for the CM scheme is similar as that for the JT
scheme, and the only difference lies in the backhaul delay
caused by the content fetching process in the former. Due to
the extra delay, the actual delivery time in the CM scheme
reduces and hence the required secrecy rate increases from
Rs (for the JT scheme) to δRs, where δ > 1 captures the
impact of backhaul delay.
It is worth mentioning that, for a fair comparison between
the JT and OT schemes, we consider identical target secrecy
rate Rs in both schemes. In practice, the secrecy rate can cor-
respond to the end-to-end rate of a specific service requested
by subscribers such that its value may be pre-established.
Furthermore, all the SBSs should set a same wiretap codeword
rate Rt and a same redundant rate Re in the JT scheme due
to the joint transmission of a same file; whereas they can
choose different rates in the OT scheme due to the orthogonal
transmission of different subfiles. This also means that, the
wiretap codeword rates (also the redundant rates) in the JT
and OT schemes are not necessarily the same and actually
their values should be properly designed for maximizing the
SCDP as will be discussed in Sec. IV.
A. Connection Probability
1) JT Scheme: In this case, the achievable rate of the main
channel is Cb = log2 (1 + SNRb) with SNRb given in (2).
Let Rt = log2 (1 + βt) be the wiretap codeword rate with
βt , 2Rt − 1. The connection probability can be expressed as
pJTc = P{SNRb ≥ βt}, which is calculated as
pJTc = P


∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
hb,kr
−α/2
b,k
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ βt
ρ

 (a)= e
−
βt/ρ∑K
k=1
r
−α
b,k , (8)
where step (a) follows from the fact that
∣∣∣∑Kk=1 hb,kr−α/2b,k ∣∣∣2
is exponentially distributed with mean
∑K
k=1 r
−α
b,k .
2) OT Scheme: In this case, the achievable rate of the main
channel of the k-th SBS is Cb,k = log2 (1 + SNRb,k) with
SNRb,k given in (4). Let Rt,k = log2 (1 + βt,k) be the wiretap
codeword rate of the k-th SBS with βt,k = 2
Rt,k − 1. Since
the entire file can be recovered only if all the subfiles have
already been decoded. Therefore, the connection probability
can be expressed as pOTc = P
{⋂
k∈K SNRb,k ≥ βt,k
}
, which
is calculated as
pOTc =
K∏
k=1
P
{
|hb,k|2 r−αb,k ≥
βt,k
Kρ
}
= e−
∑K
k=1 r
α
b,kβt,k
Kρ . (9)
Comparing (9) with (8), we find that if βt = βt,k for
k ∈ K, i.e., the same wiretap codeword rate is used in the
JT and OT schemes, we have pJTc ≥ pOTc as 1/
∑K
k=1 r
−α
b,k ≤
mink∈K r
α
b,k ≤
∑K
k=1 r
α
b,k/K . This shows the superiority of
the JT scheme in terms of transmission reliability.
B. Secrecy Probability
We consider both non-colluding and colluding eavesdrop-
ping (NCE/CE) scenarios. In the NCE case, eavesdroppers
individually decode the confidential information and thus the
content can be delivered secretly if only the achievable rate
of the most deteriorate eavesdropper maxej∈Φe Cj does not
exceed the redundant rate Re, i.e., maxej∈Φe Cj ≤ Re. In
the CE case, eavesdroppers jointly decode the confidential
information using the maximal ratio combination (MRC)
method. The content delivery is deemed to be secret only if
the achievable rate of the equivalent wiretap channel Ce does
not lie beyond the redundant rate Re, i.e., Ce ≤ Re.
1) JT Scheme for NCE Case: In this case, the achievable
rate of the j-th eavesdropper is Cj = log2 (1 + SNRj) with
SNRj given in (3). Let Re = log2 (1 + βe) be the redundant
rate with βe , 2Re − 1. The secrecy probability can be
expressed as pJTs,nce = P
{
maxej∈Φe SNRj ≤ βe
}
, which is
calculated as
pJTs,nce = EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
P


∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
hj,kr
−α/2
j,k
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ βe
ρ




(b)
= EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
(
1− e−
βe/ρ∑K
k=1
r
−α
k
)
(c)
= exp
(
−2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
e
− βe/ρ∑K
k=1
r
−α
k rdrdθ
)
, (10)
where step (b) follows from knowing that
∣∣∣∑Kk=1 hj,kr−α/2j,k ∣∣∣2
is an exponential RV with mean
∑K
k=1 r
−α
j,k , and step (c)
holds by using the probability generating functional (PGFL)
over a PPP [39] with rk =
√
r2b,k + r
2 − 2rb,kr cos(θb,k − θ).
Although the result in (10) does not appear in a closed form,
the integral therein is fairly easy to compute.
2) OT Scheme for NCE Case: In this case, the achievable
rate of the wiretap channel from the k-th SBS to the j-
th eavesdropper is Cj,k = log2 (1 + SNRj,k) with SNRj,k
given in (5). Let Re,k = log2 (1 + βe,k) be the redundant
rate of the k-th SBS with βe,k , 2Re,k − 1. Note that
a file is intercepted only if all its subfiles have already
been intercepted. Then, the secrecy probability can be given
by pOTs,nce = P
{⋃
k∈K SNRj,k ≤ βe,k, ∀ej ∈ Φe
}
, which is
calculated as
pOTs,nce = EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
(
1−
K∏
k=1
P {SNRj,k > βe,k}
)

= EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
(
1− e−
∑K
k=1 r
α
k βe,k
Kρ
)
= exp
(
−2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
e−
∑K
k=1 r
α
k βe,k
Kρ rdrdθ
)
. (11)
Comparing (11) with (10), if the same redundant rate is
employed in the JT and OT schemes, i.e., βe = βe,k for k ∈ K,
we have pOTs ≥ pJTs since 1/
∑K
k=1 r
−α
k ≤ mink∈K rαk <∑K
k=1 r
α
k /K . This means the OT scheme provides a higher
level of secrecy than does the JT scheme. For the special case
6with α = 2, we can obtain a more concise expression for
pOTs,nce as given below
pOTs,α=2 = exp
(
−ρλe (π + ZK) e−
∑K
k=1
r2
b,k
βe,k
Kρ
)
, (12)
where ZK =
∫ π
0
√
πzez
2
[1 + erf(z)] dθ with z =∑K
k=1 rb,k cos(θb,k − θ)/(K
√
ρ).
3) JT Scheme for CE Case: In this case, the achiev-
able rate of the equivalent wiretap channel is Ce =
log2
(
1 +
∑
ej∈Φe
SNRj
)
with SNRj given in (3). Let Ie =∑
ej∈Φe
SNRj . Then, the secrecy probability can be expressed
as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Ie, i.e.,
pJTs,ce = P {Ie ≤ βe}. In order to compute pJTs,ce, we first
calculate the Laplace transform of Ie.
Lemma 1: The Laplace transform of Ie evaluated at value
s is given by
LIe(s) = exp
(
−2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
sρ
∑K
k=1 r
−α
k
1 + sρ
∑K
k=1 r
−α
k
rdrdθ
)
,
(13)
where rk shares the same expression as (10).
Proof 1: Recalling (3), the Laplace transform LIe (s) =
EIe
[
e−sIe
]
can be calculated as
LIe (s)
(d)
= EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
Ehj,k
[
e
−sρ
∣∣∣∑Kk=1 hj,kr−α/2j,k ∣∣∣2
]
(e)
= EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
1
1 + sρ
∑K
k=1 r
−α
j,k

 , (14)
where step (d) follows from the independence between
channel fading and the PPP such that the expectation over
h can be moved inside the product; step (e) is obtained
by calculating the Laplace transform of an exponential RV∣∣∣∑Kk=1 hj,kr−α/2j,k ∣∣∣2. Applying the PGFL over a PPP with (14)
completes the proof.
It is intractable to give a closed form for the exact pJTs,ce. In
the following theorem, we resort to a widely used approxima-
tion method [34] and derive a closed-form approximation for
pJTs,ce.
Theorem 1: The secrecy probability in the JT scheme for
the CE case satisfies
pJTs,ce /
M∑
m=1
(
M
m
)
(−1)m+1LIe
(
mξ
βe
)
, (15)
where ξ ,M(M !)−1/M and M is the number of terms used
in the approximation.
Proof 2: The secrecy probability pJTs,ce = P {Ie ≤ βe} can
be calculated as follows,
pJTs,ce = P {Ie/βe ≤ 1}
(f)≈ P {Ie/βe ≤ ι}
(g)
/ 1− EIe
[(
1− e−ξIe/βe
)M]
, (16)
where the dummy variable ι in step (f) is a normalized gamma
RV with the PDF fι(x) = x
M−1e−x/Γ(M), and this step fol-
lows from the fact that ι converges to identity asM approaches
infinity [34]; step (g) yields an upper bound by invoking
Alzer’s inequality [35], i.e., P{ι ≥ z} ≤ 1− [1− e−ξz]M for
a constant z > 0. Using the binomial expansion with (16) and
substituting in the Laplace transform LIe (s) = EIe
[
e−sIe
]
with s = mξ/βe completes the proof.
4) OT Scheme for CE Case: In this case, the achievable rate
of the equivalent wiretap channel from the k-th SBS to the col-
luding eavesdroppers is Ce,k = log2
(
1 +
∑
ej∈Φe
SNRj,k
)
with SNRj,k given in (5). The secrecy probability can be
interpreted as the complement of the probability that all
the subfiles are intercepted by the eavesdroppers, which is
expressed as
pOTs,ce = 1−EΦe

 K∏
k=1
P


∑
ej∈Φe
|hj,k|2r−αj,k >
βe,k
Kρ



 . (17)
Since the locations of the SBSs are deterministic, the
distances between the j-th eavesdropper and any two SBSs
actually are not independent [36]. Hence, the expectation over
the PPP Φe in (17) cannot be moved inside the product, which
makes pOTs,ce difficult to compute. To facilitate the calculation,
we first consider a disc B(o,R) centered at the origin o with
a radius R and let ΦRe , Φe ∩Bo,R denote the location set of
the eavesdroppers residing in the disc Bo,R. We then calculate
the inner probability in (17) resorting to a common gamma
approximation [37]. Specifically, we approximate the term
Xk =
∑
ej∈ΦRe
|hj,k|2r−αj,k as a gamma RV, the probability
density function (PDF) of which is given by
fXk (xk; υk, τk) =
xυk−1k e
−
xk
τk
τυkk Γ(υk)
. (18)
The parameters υk and τk can be derived from matching the
first and second moments of Xk, which are given in the
following lemma with the detailed calculation relegated to
Appendix A.
Lemma 2: For fixed positions of eavesdroppers in the disc
B(o,R), υk and τk are given by
υk =
(∑
ei∈ΦRe
r−αi,k
)2
∑
ej∈ΦRe
r−2αj,k
, τk =
∑
ei∈ΦRe
r−2αi,k∑
ej∈ΦRe
r−αj,k
. (19)
For a PPP, the probability of having J eavesdroppers inside
the disc Bo,R is given by [39]
OJ , P{n = J} = e−πλeR
2
(
πλeR
2
)J
J !
. (20)
Hence, the secrecy probability in (17) can be rewritten as
pOTs,ce = 1− lim
R→∞
∞∑
J=1
OJEΦRe
[
K∏
k=1
P
{
Xk >
βe,k
Kρ
} ∣∣∣∣ΦRe , J
]
.
(21)
The exact pOTs,ce is provided by the following theorem.
7Theorem 2: The secrecy probability in the OT scheme for
the CE case is given by
pOTs,ce = 1− lim
R→∞
∞∑
J=1
λJe e
−πλeR
2
J !
×

∫ R
o
∫ 2π
0
K∏
k=1
Γ
(
υk,
βe,k
Kρτk
)
Γ (υk)
rdrdθ


J
(22)
where υk and τk are given in (19).
Proof 3: Recalling the PDF of Xk in (18), the inner
probability in (21) can be given by
P
{
Xk >
βe,k
Kρ
}
=
1
Γ (υk)
Γ
(
υk,
βe,k
Kρτk
)
. (23)
Conditioned on having J eavesdroppers in the disc Bo,R, the
distribution of the eavesdroppers’ locations follows a binomial
point process (BPP). Using the i.i.d. property of a BPP, the
joint PDF of the distances rk = [r1,k, · · · , rJ,k]T and angles
θk = [θ1,k, · · · , θJ,k]T is given by
frk,θk(r1, · · · , rJ , θ1, · · · , θJ ) =
J∏
j=1
rj
πR2
. (24)
Substituting (20), (23), and (24) into (21) completes the proof.
Although Theorem 2 does not give a closed-form expression
for the secrecy probability, it yields a general and exact result
without requiring time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations.
Furthermore, it provides a benchmark for comparison with
other approximate results.
If the distance between any two adjacent SBSs is large
enough, the correlation of the distances between an eaves-
dropper and any two SBSs can be ignored due to the random
mobility of eavesdroppers. In other words, the positions of
eavesdroppers seen from different SBSs can be regarded as
independent PPPs Φe,k with the same density λe. In this case,
the secrecy probability in (17) can be recast as
pOTs,ce = 1−
K∏
k=1
P


∑
ej∈Φe,k
Kρ|hj,k|2r˜−αj,k > βe,k

 , (25)
where r˜j,k denotes the distance between the j-th eavesdropper
and the k-th SBS after shifting the coordinate system to place
the k-th SBS at the origin. Note that r˜j,k is distinguished from
rj,k given in (17). Since the expectation over Φe,k is moved
inside the product, the computation can be greatly simplified.
Let Ik = Kρ
∑
ej∈Φe,k
|hj,k|2r˜−αj,k . We first give the Laplace
transform of Ik in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ([32, Eqn. (8)]): Let κ , πΓ(1+2/α)Γ(1−2/α).
The Laplace transform of Ik is
LIk(s) = exp
(
−κλe(Kρs)2/α
)
. (26)
Similar to Theorem 1, a closed-form expression for an upper
bound of pOTs,ce is given below.
Theorem 3: The secrecy probability in the OT scheme for
the CE case satisfies
pOTs,ce / 1−
K∏
k=1
M∑
m=0
(
M
m
)
(−1)mLIk
(
mξ
βe,k
)
, (27)
where ξ and M have been stated in Theorem 1.
For the special case with α = 4, we can further derive a
closed-form expression for the exact pOTs,ce. The PDF of Ik can
be obtained from the inverse Laplace transform of LIk(s), i.e.,
fα=4Ik (x) = L−1Ik (s) =
κλe
√
Kρ
2
√
πx3/2
exp
(
−κ
2λ2eKρ
4x
)
. (28)
Plugging (28) into (25) yields
pOT,α=4s,ce = 1−
K∏
k=1
∫ ∞
βe,k
fα=4Ik (x)dx
(h)
= 1−
K∏
k=1
erf
(
κλe
2
√
Kρ
βe,k
)
, (29)
where step (h) follows from the substitution κ2λ2eKρ/(4x)→
t2. Since erf(z) < 1 increases with z, it is apparent that pOTs,ce
increases with the number of SBSs K and the redundant rate
Re, whereas decreases with the density of eavesdroppers λe
and the normalized SNR ρ.
IV. SECURE CONTENT DELIVERY PROBABILITY
MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we jointly design the optimal redundant
rate Re and the optimal caching assignment proportion φ to
maximize the overall SCDP Pscd. From the definition of Pscd
given in (6), we observe that the problem of maximizing Pscd
can be decomposed into two steps: 1) designing the optimal
Re to maximize the SCDP PSscd = pScpSs for for each scheme
S ∈ {JT,OT,CM}; 2) designing the optimal φ to maximize
the overall SCDP Pscd. In what follows, we perform the
optimization procedure step by step.
A. Optimization of Redundant Rate Re
This subsection determines the optimal redundant rate Re
for a target secrecy rate Rs to maximize the SCDP for
scheme S ∈ {JT,OT,CM}. For tractability, we focus on the
NCE case. The optimization in the CE case can be operated
similarly, which however would result in a considerable cal-
culation complexity and a much more sophisticated analysis
but provide no significant qualitative difference.
1) JT Scheme: The SCDP in this case is defined as the
product of the connection probability pJTc in (8) and the
secrecy probability in (10), i.e., PJTscd = pJTc pJTs , which can
be written as
PJTscd = exp
(
−Aβt − 2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ
)
,
(30)
where A , 1/
(
ρ
∑K
k=1 r
−α
b,k
)
and B(r, θ) =
1/
(
ρ
∑K
k=1 r
−α
k
)
. Since we have Rt = Rs + Re ⇒
βt = βs + (1 + βs)βe, substituting βt into (30) yields
PJTscd = e−Aβse−Q(βe) such that maximizing PJTscd is
equivalent to minimizing the auxiliary function Q(βe) given
below,
Q(βe) = A(1+ βs)βe+2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ. (31)
8Hence, we focus on the following problem, and the solution
is given in Theorem 4,
min
βe
Q(βe), s.t. βe > 0. (32)
Theorem 4: Q(βe) is convex on βe, and the solution β
⋆
e to
problem (32) is characterized by
dQ(β⋆e )
dβ⋆e
= 0, (33)
i.e., it is the unique zero-crossing of the derivative dQ(βe)/dβe
given below
dQ(βe)
dβe
= A(1+βs)− 2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
B(r, θ)e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ.
(34)
Proof 4: Please refer to Appendix B.
Appendix B shows that dQ(βe)/dβe increases from nega-
tive to positive as βe increases from zero to infinity. Then, the
value of β⋆e can be efficiently obtained via a bisection search
with equation (33). The following corollary develops some
insights into the behavior of β⋆e .
Corollary 1: The optimal β⋆e that maximizes PJTscd increases
with the eavesdropper density λe, and decreases with the
secrecy rate Rs and the SBS-user distance rb,k for k ∈ K.
Proof 5: Let us take λe as an example. Denote dQ(βe)/dβe
in (34) as Q1(βe) such that Q1(β
⋆
e ) = 0. Using the derivative
rule for implicit functions with Q1(β
⋆
e ) = 0 yields,
dQ1(β
⋆
e )
dλe
= −∂Q1(β
⋆
e )/∂λe
∂Q1(β⋆e )/∂βe
=
∫∞
0
∫ π
0
B(r, θ)e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ
λe
∫∞
0
∫ π
0 B
2(r, θ)e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ
> 0. (35)
Hence, β⋆e increases with λe. The other conclusions can be
obtained in a similar way.
Corollary 1 captures an inherent trade-off between the reli-
ability and secrecy. We should choose a large redundant rate
for dense eavesdroppers, whereas we should keep redundant
rate low for a large target secrecy rate or for a remote user
2) OT Scheme: The SCDP in this case is can be obtained
by computing the product of the connection probability pOTc
in (9) and the secrecy probability pOTs in (11), which is given
below,
POTscd = exp
(
− 1
Kρ
K∑
k=1
rαb,k[βs + (1 + βs)βe,k]−
2λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ π
0
e−
1
Kρ
∑K
k=1 r
α
k βe,krdrdθ
)
. (36)
Compared with the JT scheme, the SBSs in the OT scheme
can use different redundant rates for maximizing the SCDP.
We assume that the knowledge of SBS-user distances is known
at the SBSs and can be exploited to determine the optimal
redundant rates at different SBSs. In order to jointly design
the redundant ratesRe,k for k ∈ K, we recast (36) into a vector
form, i.e., POTscd = e−
βs
Kρ‖rb‖1e−Ω(βe), where the auxiliary
function Ω(βe) is given as below,
Ω(βe) =
1 + βs
Kρ
rTb βe+λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
e−
1
Kρ r
T
e βerdrdθ, (37)
with rb = [r
α
b,1, · · · , rαb,K ]T ≥ 0, re = [rα1 , · · · , rαK ]T ≥ 0,
and βe = [βe,1, · · · , βe,K ]T ≥ 0. Apparently, to maximize
POTscd we only need to tackle the following minimization
problem,
min
βe
Ω(βe), s.t. βe ≥ 0. (38)
We point out that the objective function Ω(βe) in (37) is
strictly convex on βe due to the summation of an affine func-
tion and an integral with exponential terms. Generally, problem
(38) can be numerically resolved using some gradient meth-
ods, e.g., Newton’s method [41]. However, Newton’s method
requires forming and storing the Hessian matrix repeatedly and
the computation of the Newton step requires solving a set of
linear equations. All these operations will bring the system a
huge computational burden and thus resulting in a low system
efficiency, particularly when the number of SBSs K goes
large. To reduce the computational complexity, we propose
to process problem (38) through an alternating optimization
(AO) as described below. Denote
(
β
(n)
e,1 , · · · , β(n)e,K
)
as the
AO iterate at the n-th iteration, and let βˆ
(n)
e,k = β
(n)
e \ β(n)e,k .
We solve the following K subproblems alternatively to obtain(
β
(n)
e,1 , · · · , β(n)e,K
)
for n = 1, 2, · · ·
β
(n)
e,k = arg minβe,k≥0
Ω
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
. (39)
Lemma 4: When the values of βe,j for j 6= k are given, the
solution to problem (39) is
β⋆e,k =

0,
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k ,βe,k
)
dβe,k
∣∣
βe,k=0
≥ 0,
β◦e,k, otherwise,
(40)
where β◦e,k is the unique zero-crossing of the derivative given
below,
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
dβe,k
=
(1 + βs)rb,k − 2λe
∫∞
0
∫ π
0
re,ke
−
rTe βe
Kρ rdrdθ
Kρ
.
(41)
Proof 6: Since Q
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
in (37) is a convex function
of βe,k, it arrives at the minimal value at βe,k = 0 if(
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
/dβe,k
)
|βe,k=0 ≥ 0 or at the zero-crossing
of dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
/dβe,k otherwise.
The value of β◦e,k can be efficiently calculated through a
bisection search with dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , β
◦
e,k
)
/dβ◦e,k = 0.
Lemma 4 suggests that the remote SBS, e.g., with a large
distance rb,k such that
(
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
/dβe,k
)
|βe,k=0 ≥ 0,
should set zero redundant rate. With Lemma 4, we summarize
the whole AO process in Algorithm 1. Notably, the proposed
AO iterative algorithm produces descending objective values,
i.e., Ω
(
β
(n)
e
)
< Ω
(
β
(n−1)
e
)
, · · · , < Ω
(
β
(0)
e
)
. Moreover, it
has a theoretically provable guarantee on the global optimality
of our solution and its convergence.
Proposition 1: Every limit point β⋆e of the iterates
{
β
(n)
e
}
generated by the AO process in (39) is a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) point of the primal problem (38).
9Algorithm 1 AO Algorithm for Problem (38)
1: Initialize n = 1, β
(0)
e ≥ 0, and assign ǫ a sufficiently
small positive value, e.g., ǫ = 10−10;
2: Update β
(n)
e ← β(n−1)e ;
3: for k = 1 to K do
4: if
(
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , βe,k
)
/dβe,k
)
|βe,k=0 ≥ 0 then
5: β
(n)
e,k ← 0;
6: else
7: Calculate β
(n)
e,k through a bisection search with the
equation dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , β
(n)
e,k
)
/dβ
(n)
e,k = 0;
8: end if
9: Update β
(n)
e
10: end for
11: while
∣∣∣[Ω(β(n)e )− Ω(β(n−1)e )] /Ω(β(n−1)e )∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ do
12: Update n← n+ 1;
13: Repeat step 2 to step 10;
14: end while
15: Output β
(n)
e
Proof 7: Since the objective function Ω(βe) in (38) is
a strictly convex function of βe, the KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient for the solution to problem (38) [41]:
▽Ω (β⋆e)− λ⋆ = 0, (42a)
β⋆e ≥ 0, λ⋆ ≥ 0, λ⋆kβ⋆e,k = 0, k ∈ K, (42b)
where λ⋆ is the Lagrange multiplier introduced for the in-
equality constraints given in (38). Note that since λ⋆ acts as a
slack variable in (42a), it actually can be eliminated, leaving
β⋆e ≥ 0, ▽Ω (β⋆e) ≥ 0, β⋆e,k
dΩ(β⋆e )
dβ⋆e,k
= 0, k ∈ K. (43)
Now, let us recall Lemma 4, from which we have
β⋆e,k ≥ 0,
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , β
⋆
e,k
)
dβ⋆e,k
≥ 0, β⋆e,k
dQ
(
βˆ
(n)
e,k , β
⋆
e,k
)
dβ⋆e,k
= 0.
(44)
Evidently, (44) gives the KKT conditions for the k-th subprob-
lem (39). The combination of the KKT conditions for the K
subproblems is exactly the KKT conditions for problem (38).
For a simplified case where all the SBSs use the same
redundant rate Re, a more computation-convenient solution
to problem (38) can be provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: If all the SBSs use the same redundant rate Re,
the optimal β⋆e that minimizes Q (βe) in (38) is the unique
zero-crossing of the derivative dQ (βe)/dβe given below
dQ (βe)
dβe
=
1 + βs
Kρ
‖rb‖1−
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
λe‖re‖1
Kρ
e−
‖re‖1βe
Kρ rdrdθ.
(45)
The value of β⋆e can be efficiently calculated via a bisection
search with equation dQ (βe)/dβe = 0. Some insights into the
solution β⋆e that are similar to Corollary 1 can be developed.
3) CM Scheme: The SCDP in the CM scheme has the same
expression as in the JT scheme, only with Rs increasing to
δRs. Therefore, the optimal βe that maximizes the SCDP in
the CM scheme shares the same form as in Theorem 4, simply
by replacing βs with 2
δRs − 1.
B. Optimization of Caching Assignment Proportion φ
This subsection determines the optimal caching assignment
proportion φ that maximizes the overall SCDP Pscd in (6) with
pStr for S ∈ {JT,OT,CM} given in (7a) and (7b). Note that
the summation of discrete sequence aroused by pStr hampers
the optimization of the overall SCDP. Fortunately, the sum of
the Zipf probabilities can be approximated as [38]
M∑
n=1
fn ≈ M
1−γ − 1
N1−γ − 1 . (46)
Invoking (46) with (7a) and (7b) and plugging the obtained
results into (6) with the integer ⌊φL⌋ replaced with the
continuous quantity φL, Pscd can be simplified as a continuous
function of φ,
Pscd ≈ Pˆjoφ
1−γ + Pˆoc[K −Kφ+ φ]1−γ − PˆjcLγ−1
Lγ−1(N1−γ − 1) +P
CM
scd ,
(47)
where Pˆjo = PJTscd − POTscd , Pˆoc = POTscd − PCMscd , and
Pˆjc = PJTscd − PCMscd denote the SCDP differences, with PSscd
being the SCDP for the scheme S ∈ {JT,OT,CM}. Before
proceeding to derive the optimal φ that maximizes Pscd, we
give the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The JT scheme gives a larger SCDP than does
the CM scheme, i.e., PJTscd > PCMscd .
Proof 8: Note that PCMscd shares the same expression as PJTscd
in (30) only with βs increasing from 2
Rs−1 to 2δRs−1. Then,
to complete the proof we only need to prove that the maximal
PJTscd with the optimal β⋆e given in Theorem 4 decreases with
βs. By re-expressing PJTscd = e−W (βs) where W (βs) = Aβs+
Q(β⋆e (βs)) with A and Q(β
⋆
e (βs)) given in (31), it is also
equivalent to proving that W (βs) is an increasing function of
βs. The derivative dW (βs)/dβs is given by
dW (βs)
dβs
= A(1 + β⋆e ) +
dβ⋆e
dβs
dQ(β⋆e )
dβ⋆e
. (48)
From (33) we know that dQ(β⋆e )/dβ
⋆
e = 0. Hence, we have
dW (βs)/dβs > 0.
Theorem 6: With the proposed hybrid caching placement
strategy, the optimal proportion φ that maximizes Pscd in (47)
is given by
φ⋆ =


1, Pˆjo > (K − 1)Pˆoc,
0, Pˆjo < 0,
1
1+ 1K
[(
(K−1)Pˆoc
Pˆjo
) 1
γ
−1
] , otherwise. (49)
Proof 9: Please refer to Appendix C.
Theorem 6 shows that the SCDP difference between dif-
ferent transmission schemes is critical to the optimal caching
assignment. Specifically, when PCMscd exceeds POTscd or when
PJTscd−POTscd is K−1 times larger than POTscd −PCMscd , we have
10
澳
澳 澳
濗 濗
濦濕濦濄澳澻濃澿濃澼
濫瀖
濨瀆濸瀅澳澻濫瀈澿澳濷濃濂濅澼澳
濦濕濦濞澳
濘瀉濸
濬
Fig. 2: Model used for experiments. K SBSs are placed along the horizontal
axis with an identical distance D, and the k-th nearest SBS to the origin is
located at (0, (k− 1)D). The user moves along the horizontal direction with
a location (Xu, d0/2). Eavesdroppers are randomly distributed according to
a PPP.
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Fig. 3: Secrecy probability ps,nce vs. Re for different values of λe, with
K = 3.
φ⋆ = 1, meaning that caching the MPFs is more conductive.
As POTscd increases, the optimal φ⋆ becomes smaller, i.e., a
larger proportion of the cache unit should be assigned for the
DSFs. We also can prove that the optimal φ⋆ increases with
the content popularity skewness γ. The reason behind is that
as the content popularity becomes more concentrated (i.e., a
larger γ), the benefit of caching different files becomes limited.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to validate
our theoretical analysis. For simplicity, we consider a two-
dimensional system model as illustrated in Fig. 2. Without loss
of generality, we set a reference distance d0 = 100 m and
a reference density λ0 = 10
−6 nodes/m2. Unless specified
otherwise, we fix the normalized SNR ρ = P/(WN0) = 10
dB, the path-loss exponent α = 4, the distance between two
adjacent SBSs D = d0, the content library size N = 100, and
the SBS caching capacity L = 20.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 depict the secrecy probabilities versus the
redundant rates Re in the NCE and CE cases, respectively.
The Monte-Carlo simulation results match well with the
theoretical values. Both figures verify the superiority of the OT
scheme over the JT scheme in terms of transmission secrecy.
As expected, the secrecy probability increases with Re and
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Fig. 4: Secrecy probability ps,ce vs. Re for different values of M , with
K = 3, D = 6d0, and λe = 3λ0.
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Fig. 5: SCDP PJT
scd
vs. Re for different values of λe and Rs, with K = 3,
and Xu = 3d0.
decreases with λe. Fig. 4 shows that the approximate results
given in (15) and (27) coincide well with the real ones when
M = 5. We also find that the results in (29) approach the
simulated ones in (22), particularly for a large distance D,
e.g., D = 6d0. This is because, for a sufficiently large D, the
correlation in the distances between an eavesdropper and any
two SBSs can be ignored.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 plot the SCDP PSscd as a function of the
redundant rate Re in the JT and OT schemes, respectively. Fig.
5 shows that the SCDP PJTscd in the JT scheme first increases
and then decreases with Re, just as proved in Theorem 4. We
also find that the optimal Re that maximizes PJTscd increases
with a larger λe or a smallerRs, verifying the insights obtained
in Corollary 1. Fig. 6 shows how the SCDP POTscd in the OT
scheme varies with the redundant rates Re,k at different SBSs
when the user is located differently. Sub-figures (a) to (d)
show that POTscd is dominated by the redundant rate at the
closer SBS to the user. This suggests that in order to improve
the SCDP, we should set zero redundant rate at those remote
SBSs and should carefully design the redundant rates at those
neighboring SBSs, just as indicated in Lemma 4.
Fig. 7 illustrates how the SCDP is affected by the geograph-
ical relationship between the user and the SBSs in various
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Fig. 7: SCDP PS
scd
for S ∈ {JT,OT,CM} vs. Xu for different values of
λe, with K = 3, δ = 2, and Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz.
transmission schemes. With the experimental model described
in Fig. 2 in mind, we find that for the JT scheme, if only
the user moves close to one of the SBSs, the SCDP can be
remarkably improved. Whereas for the OT scheme, only if
the user is located approximately at the center of the SBSs, or
there is no significant difference among the distances between
the user and different SBSs, a high SCDP can be achieved;
otherwise the SCDP performance is severely degraded. In
addition, Fig. 7 shows that the JT scheme outperforms the
CM scheme, just as proved in Lemma 5. However, whether
the JT or the OT scheme is superior depends on the specific
transmission environment. For example, as can be seen from
Fig. 7, in a sparse eavesdropper scenario, the JT scheme
outperforms the OT scheme; whereas in a dense eavesdropper
case and when the user is located at the center of the SBSs,
the OT scheme provides a higher benefit for the secure content
delivery.
Fig. 8 shows how the optimal caching placement is influ-
enced by the user’s location and the eavesdropper density.
When eavesdroppers are distributed sparsely (a small λe) or
when the user is located far away from the SBSs, the SCDP is
bottlenecked by the connection probability. This suggests that
the SBSs should adopt the JT scheme to improve transmission
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Fig. 8: Optimal caching proportion φ⋆ vs. Xu for different values of λe and
γ, with K = 3, δ = 2, and Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz.
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Fig. 9: Optimal caching assignment proportion φ⋆ vs. Rs for different K and
λe, with γ = 1.2, and δ = 3.
reliability. Hence, the optimal φ⋆ goes to one, meaning that
caching the MPFs is more beneficial. When the eavesdropper
density λe increases or the user moves close to the SBSs,
the secrecy probability becomes the major bottleneck for
improving the SCDP. In order to guarantee a certain level
of secrecy, the OT scheme is preferred. Hence, the optimal
φ⋆ approaches zero, suggesting that the SBSs should store the
DSFs geographically. For a moderate density of eavesdroppers
or SBS-user distance, the optimal φ⋆ lies between zero and
one, showing that there exists a trade-off between caching the
MPFs and the DSFs. We also find that the optimal φ⋆ increases
with the content popularity skewness γ, which coincides with
the finding given in Theorem 6.
Fig. 9 depicts the optimal caching proportion φ⋆ versus the
target secrecy rate Rs. Monte-Carlo simulated results match
well with the theoretical values, verifying the accuracy of the
approximation in (47). We show that φ⋆ initially is small
at the small Rs region and then increases with Rs. This
is because, to support a large Rs, transmission reliability
should be adequately ensured and thus the JT scheme becomes
favorable. We also observe that φ⋆ increases with the number
of SBSs K . This means, with more cooperative SBSs, the
benefit from caching the MPFs along with the JT scheme
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Fig. 10: Overall SCDP Pscd vs. Rs for different λe, with K = 3, γ = 1.2,
and δ = 3.
would be more pronounced.
Fig. 10 compares the overall SCDPs for different caching
strategies. We show that the proposed hybrid caching strategy
outperforms either the MPF-only or the DSF-only scheme. In
particular, hybrid caching can provide a remarkable perfor-
mance gain over MPF-only caching for a small secrecy rate
Rs and a large eavesdropper density λe, or over DSF-only
caching for a large Rs and a small λe. In addition, the SCDP
performance without caching severely deteriorates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies the security issue in a cache-enabled
cooperative SCN against randomly located eavesdroppers. We
propose a hybrid MPF and DSF caching strategy along with
the JT and OT schemes. We derive analytical expressions for
the SCDP in each transmission scheme for both NCE and CE
scenarios, based on which the optimal transmission rates and
the optimal caching assignment are jointly designed for max-
imizing the overall SCDP. We also develop various insights
into the optimal designs. Numerical results demonstrate the
superiority of the proposed hybrid caching strategy over the
MPF- and DSF-only ones in terms of the SCDP.
This paper opens up several interesting research directions.
For example, the proposed analysis and design framework can
be extended to investigate the cooperative multi-antenna SBSs
in cache-enabled SCNs, where artificial jamming signals can
be exploited to confound eavesdroppers. The potential of PLS
can be further tapped by performing adaptive designs lever-
aging the instantaneous CSI of the main channels. Studying
the secure content delivery from a network perspective, e.g.,
considering a multi-cell cellular network, is also an interesting
issue. Nevertheless, this might be much more sophisticated,
since we should analyze the influence of both random in-
terferers and eavesdroppers. Another possible direction is to
consider diverse secrecy attributes for different files, and to
explore more intelligent caching strategies.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
The i-th cumulant of the RV Xk is defined as
Q
(i)
Xk
=
diEXk
[
eωXk
]
dωi
∣∣
ω=0
. (50)
The mean and variance of Xk are µXk = Q
(1)
Xk
and σ2Xk =
Q
(2)
Xk
−
(
Q
(1)
Xk
)2
. Hence, the parameters υk and τk in (18)
can be calculated as υk = µ
2
Xk
/σ2Xk and τk = σ
2
Xk
/µXk .
Recall that Xk =
∑
ej∈ΦRe
|hj,k|2r−αj,k . Due to the mutual
independence among {hj,k} for ej ∈ ΦRe , we can express
EXk
[
eωXk
]
for a fixed ΦRe as follows,
EXk
[
eωXk
]
=
∏
ej∈ΦRe
Ehj,k
[
e−ω|hj,k|
2r−αj,k
]
. (51)
Denote gj,k(ω) = Ehj,k
[
e−ω|hj,k|
2r−αj,k
]
such that
EXk
[
eωXk
]
=
∏
ej∈ΦRe
gj,k(ω) and Q
(i)
Xk
=(
digj,k(ω)/dω
i
) |ω=0. Then, we have gj,k(ω)|ω=0 = 1,
(dgj,k(ω)/dω) |ω=0 = r−αj,k , and
(
d2gj,k(ω)/dω
2
) |ω=0 =
2r−2αj,k . Based on these results, the first and second cumulants
of Xk respectively can be calculated as
Q
(1)
Xk
=
∑
ej∈ΦRe
∏
el∈ΦRe \ej
(
gl,k(ω)
dgj,k(ω)
dω
) ∣∣
ω=0
=
∑
ej∈ΦRe
r−αj,k ,
(52)
Q
(2)
Xk
=
∑
ej∈ΦRe

 ∏
el∈ΦRe \ej
(
gl,k(ω)
d2gj,k(ω)
dω2
)
+
dgj,k(ω)
dω
×
∑
el∈ΦRe \ej
∏
eq∈ΦRe \{ej ,el}
(
gq,k(ω)
dgl,k(ω)
dω
) ∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
∑
ej∈ΦRe

2r−2αj,k + r−αj,k ∑
el∈ΦRe \ej
r−αl,k

 . (53)
After some algebraic manipulations, we can obtain µXk =∑
ej∈ΦRe
r−αj,k and σ
2
Xk
=
∑
ej∈ΦRe
r−2αj,k , and substituting them
into the expressions of υk and τk completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Recall (34), and the second derivative d2Q(βe)/dβ
2
e can be
given by
d2Q(βe)
dβ2e
= λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
B2(r, θ)e−B(r,θ)βerdrdθ > 0.
(54)
This means that Q(βe) is strictly convex on βe. Next, we
determine the signs of dQ(βe)/dβe at βe → ∞ and βe =
0. We can prove that (dQ(βe)/dβe) |βe→∞ = A(1 + βs) >
0 from (34), and (dQ(βe)/dβe) |βe=0 < 0 by realizing that
Pscd|βe=0 = 0 and Pscd|βe>0 > 0 from (30), respectively.
Since dQ(βe)/dβe increases with βe, there exists a unique βe
that satisfies dQ(βe)/dβe = 0, which is the solution to (32).
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C. Proof of Theorem 6
Recall (47), and the first and second derivatives of Pscd
respectively can be given by
dPscd
dφ
=
φ−γPˆjo − (K − 1)[K − φ(K − 1)]−γPˆoc
∆
, (55)
d2Pscd
dφ2
= −φ
−γ−1Pˆjo + (K − 1)2[K − φ(K − 1)]−γ−1Pˆoc
∆γ−1
,
(56)
where ∆ , Lγ−1
(
N1−γ − 1)/(1− γ) > 0. Since PJTscd >
PCMscd always holds, we can determine the optimal φ that max-
imizes Pscd by distinguishing three cases: 1) If POTscd < PCMscd ,
we have dPscd/dφ > 0, i.e., Pscd monotonically increases
with φ. Hence, Pscd reaches the maximal value at φ⋆ = 1; 2) If
POTscd > PJTscd, we have dPscd/dφ < 0, i.e., Pscd monotonically
decreases with φ. Then, the maximal Pscd is achieved at
φ⋆ = 0; 3) If PJTscd ≥ POTscd ≥ PCMscd , we have d2Pscd/dφ2 < 0,
i.e., Pscd is concave on φ. Since (dPscd/dφ) |φ=0 > 0, Pscd
arrives at the maximal value at φ = 1 if (dPscd/dφ) |φ=1 > 0
or otherwise at the zero-crossing of the derivative dPscd/dφ.
By now, we have completed the proof.
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